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RATIONAL IRRATIONALITY: 
WHY PLAYING THE WORLD TRADE 
ORGANIZATION AS A SCAPEGOAT 
REDUCES THE SOCIAL COSTS OF 
ARMCHAIR ECONOMICS  
Joseph Siprut∗ 
INTRODUCTION 
he World Trade Organization (“WTO”) may be one of the 
most reviled institutions on the planet.  If so, then this 
villainous role is one that the WTO should happily continue to 
play.  This Article proposes a theoretical model of the political 
economy of international trade that conceives of the WTO as 
something more than a mere institution administering multi-
lateral trade agreements.  Like any regime of multilateral 
agreements premised on reciprocity, the WTO promotes free 
trade by mobilizing export interest groups to counteract the 
pressures of domestic producer interest groups, thereby making 
tariff reductions politically feasible.  
But the WTO may serve the free trade cause in a less obvious 
manner.  As illustrated below, because the average voter be-
lieves that unrestricted free trade produces negative conse-
quences, politicians may treat adherence to the multilateral 
treaties administered by the WTO as a “necessary evil” to 
achieve alternative goals deemed more acceptable by voters.  
Because adherence to multilateral trade agreements will never-
theless increase the social wealth that flows from free trade, 
politicians enjoy the best of all political worlds.  Not only can 
politicians take credit for an increasingly wealthy economy by 
reference to particular domestic policies, but to appease voters 
who dislike free trade and simply refuse to think otherwise, 
politicians can plead deference to the WTO.  Accordingly, sup-
porting free trade agreements will remain, on balance, perfectly 
consistent with self-interested political behavior. 
  
 ∗ Joseph Siprut is a Chicago-based litigation attorney.  Special thanks 
are owed to John O. McGinnis, Bryan Caplan, John Hasnas, and William 
Mock, Jr. for insightful discussions on this topic.    
T
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To provide the theoretical underpinning for this model, this 
Article proceeds as follows.  Part I explains how free trade is an 
outgrowth of human nature and makes the specialization of 
labor possible.  As the principle of comparative advantage illus-
trates, more wealth is created when individuals and nations 
specialize in what each does best.  By contrast, protectionist 
policies undermine the benefits that flow from free trade, and 
pose a threat to increased societal welfare. 
As Part I illustrates, however, the true nature of democratic 
systems is such that harmful legislation is often passed because 
of the disproportionate influence of the interest groups that 
stand to benefit from the legislation.  In the context of interna-
tional trade, protectionist tariffs may be erected because of the 
concentrated lobbying efforts of the domestic producers who 
face competition from foreign imports.  Although this legislation 
may impose social costs, the politicians who are in a position to 
support such legislation will do so if it advances their personal 
interests — i.e., if it increases the odds of reelection or enhances 
personal stature.   
Part II examines the nature of the WTO, which, it is argued, 
operates as a solution to many of the problems canvassed in 
Part I.  The WTO makes tariff reduction politically feasible be-
cause, under a system of reciprocal tariff reductions, export in-
terests have an incentive to mobilize.  As Part II points out, 
however, voters may firmly believe that free trade produces 
negative consequences in the aggregate.  Indeed, the theory of 
“rational irrationality” posits that, not only do voters lack in-
centives to purchase information in order to stay informed on 
political matters, but, when the private costs of error are de 
minimus, voters will indulge their bliss beliefs and maintain 
positions which are downright irrational.  Because voters may 
therefore cling to these anti-free trade beliefs even if informa-
tion or evidence to the contrary is freely disseminated and is 
otherwise obtainable at minimal cost, self-interested political 
actors therefore have less incentive to repeal protectionist legis-
lation.  Part II concludes by arguing, however, that by treating 
adherence to the WTO as a necessary evil to achieving ends 
more popular with voters, the pursuit of increased market ac-
cess remains politically feasible behavior. 
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I. THE PROBLEM 
A. What Are We Fighting For?  The Benefits of Free Trade 
Any attempt to adequately canvass the body of literature 
demonstrating the beneficial effects of free trade would cer-
tainly be in vain.1  But to establish the theoretical base for sub-
sequent sections of this Article, it is useful to discuss some of 
the classic arguments for free trade and the costs of protection-
ism. 
By their very nature, human beings “are motivated by utility-
maximizing considerations,” and “when an opportunity for mu-
tual gain exists, ‘trade’ will take place.”2  Like other animals 
that live in groups, humans gain resources by exchange.3  De-
clining marginal value motivates our exchange, and if the ex-
change is consecrated, both parties gain.4 
Accordingly, if opportunities for exchange are maximized, 
wealth increases because individuals gain incentives to create 
  
 1. See, e.g., DENNIS C. MUELLER, PUBLIC CHOICE II 238 (1989) (“Few issues 
elicit greater agreement among economists than the proposition that society’s 
welfare is maximized when there is free trade.”).  For economically sophisti-
cated arguments against free trade, see ELHANAN HELPMAN & PAUL R. 
KRUGMAN, MARKET STRUCTURE AND FOREIGN TRADE: INCREASING RETURNS, 
IMPERFECT COMPETITION, AND THE INTERNATIONAL ECONOMY (1985); PAUL R. 
KRUGMAN, RETHINKING INTERNATIONAL TRADE (1990).  For a further sampling 
of anti-free trade literature, see Jim Chen, Globalization and Its Losers, 9 
MINN. J. GLOBAL TRADE 157, 159 (2000) (arguing that “[t]o the extent that 
globalized society must choose, it should systematically favor the environment 
over jobs and even culture”); WILLIAM GREIDER, ONE WORLD, READY OR NOT 
(1997) (arguing that global capitalism is reproducing the “terrible exploita-
tions” of the industrial era).  For a scathing review of One World, see John O. 
McGinnis, Keynesian Capers, NAT’L REV., May 5, 1997, at 54 (“[Greider’s] solu-
tion to economic dislocation is to take every social theory that has failed at the 
level of the nation-state and globalize it.”). 
 2. MUELLER, supra note 1, at 267. 
 3. See John O. McGinnis, The Origins of Conservatism, NAT’L REV., Dec. 
22, 1997, at 32 (“Because of innate reciprocal altruism, exchange is thus as 
natural to man as song is to a songbird.”). 
 4. For example, if Jones has one hundred apples and Smith one hundred 
oranges, by hypothesis, the value of an additional apple to Jones is worth less 
than the value of an additional apple to Smith.  If Smith and Jones agree to 
exchange an apple for an orange, therefore, both are better off despite the 
absence of any raw production.  Jones will continue to trade with Smith until 
the marginal value of additional oranges to Jones is no more than the mar-
ginal value of additional apples. 
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what others demand.5  Moreover, if individuals compete with 
one another to supply a particular set of goods, each gains an 
incentive to produce the product as efficiently as possible and to 
sell the product as cheaply as possible.6  The consumer ulti-
mately votes for the winner of this contest with his pocketbook.7 
Moreover, because humans function as group animals and ex-
change goods and services with one another rather than at-
tempting to gather all life-sustaining materials individually, 
individuals are afforded the opportunity to specialize in “pro-
ducing” certain goods, and then trading those goods for other 
necessary goods for which that individual may lack a compara-
tive advantage.  This is the insight at the heart of David Ri-
cardo’s principle of comparative advantage8 and Adam Smith’s 
theory of division of labor.9  Put simply, two individuals will 
both gain by trade by producing the goods for which each has a 
comparative advantage.  Smith has a comparative advantage 
over Jones in producing a good (X) if Smith’s cost of producing X 
relative to the cost of producing other goods is lower than Jones’ 
  
 5. John O. McGinnis, The Political Economy of Global Multilateralism, 
CHI. J. INT’L L. 381, 382 (2000).  Professor McGinnis also notes, however, that 
humans also have innate tendencies toward gaining wealth through organized 
hierarchy, which facilitates outright expropriation to the benefit of those 
higher in the “pecking order.”  Id.  McGinnis views this as a fundamental 
argument for constitutional structures — both on the national and interna-
tional level — that maximize opportunities for exchange and constrain hierar-
chy.   
 6. This insight, of course, is far from new or original.  See GRADY MILLER, 
THE LEGAL AND ECONOMIC BASIS OF INTERNATIONAL TRADE 1 (1996) (“[T]he 
extensive networks and practices of export trading were probably more firmly 
established as a concept two millennia ago than they are today.  In fact, many 
of the trading and legal traditions in use today were perfected in a far earlier 
age.”). 
 7. See ADAM SMITH, AN INQUIRY INTO THE NATURE AND CAUSES OF THE 
WEALTH OF NATIONS 461 (Edwin Cannan ed., 1937).  Smith notes: 
In every country it always is and must be the interest of the great 
body of the people to buy whatever they want of those who sell it 
cheapest.  The proposition is so very manifest, that it seems ridicu-
lous to take any pains to prove it; nor could it ever have been called in 
question, had not the interested sophistry of merchants and manufac-
turers confounded the common sense of mankind. 
Id. 
 8. See generally DAVID RICARDO, THE PRINCIPLES OF POLITICAL ECONOMY 
AND TAXATION (J.M. Dent & Sons 1965).     
 9. See generally SMITH, supra note 7, at 7–16. 
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cost of producing X relative to Jones’ cost of producing other 
goods.10  Or, by way of example, suppose that Smith can produce 
both more apples and more oranges than can Jones — say 
Smith can produce either 20 apples or 40 oranges, while Jones 
can produce, at most, either 10 apples or 10 oranges.  Smith 
enjoys a comparative advantage, relative to Jones, only in the 
production of oranges; Jones enjoys a comparative advantage 
over Smith in the production of apples.  The reason is that each 
orange produced by Smith costs him ½ an apple, while each or-
ange costs Jones one full apple.  But each apple produced by 
Smith costs him two oranges, while each apple produced by 
Jones costs him only one orange.   
Accordingly, even though one individual may be superior to 
another in producing all goods, both individuals will neverthe-
less improve their lot by producing only the goods for which 
each enjoys a comparative advantage, and then trading with 
one another.11 
  
 10. DAVID FRIEDMAN, HIDDEN ORDER 69 (1996).  Friedman notes:  
The error of confusing absolute advantage (“He can do everything bet-
ter than I can”) with comparative advantage typically shows up in the 
claim that because some other country has lower wages, higher pro-
ductivity, lower taxes, or some other advantage, it can undersell our 
domestic manufacturers on everything, putting our producers and 
workers out of work.  This is used as an argument for protective tar-
iffs — taxes on imports designed to keep them from competing with 
domestically produced goods. 
. . . . 
Here, as in many other cases, thinking in terms of money obscures 
what is really happening. Trade is ultimately goods for goods -—
although that may be less obvious when several countries are in-
volved, since the Japanese can use the dollars they get from us to buy 
goods from the Germans, who in turn send the dollars back to get 
goods from us. If we measure costs in goods, the Japanese cannot be 
better at producing everything. If it costs them fewer computers to 
produce a car (translation: If the cost in Japan of all the inputs used 
to produce a car divided by the cost in Japan of all the inputs used to 
produce a computer is smaller than the corresponding ratio in the 
United States), then it costs them more cars to produce a computer.  
If they trade their cars for our computers, both sides benefit. 
Id. (emphasis in original) 
 11. The gains from trade are not limited to wealth creation.  As John Stu-
art Mill noted: 
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If these principles are valid with respect to individuals, then 
they are valid with respect to individual nations.12  But just as 
individual trade may make certain individuals worse off in the 
short term, so too may international trade.  In the primitive 
example above, where individuals acquire goods in exchange for 
producing a good or providing a service that others desire, sup-
ply may exceed demand.  The specter of competition, which on 
the one hand creates incentive for each producer to produce effi-
ciently and to sell his goods cheaply, may also result in at least 
some producers no longer being able to find consumers inter-
ested in those producers’ goods.  Were this not the case, no in-
centive would exist to be efficient, and the driving force of free 
trade would be undermined. 
In the context of international trade, therefore, uniform free 
trade will not necessarily make everyone within a nation better 
off — at least not in the short term.  In any industry where the 
comparative advantage for a particular product lies abroad, it 
will become cheaper to import the goods than to pay for domes-
tic production.  Consequently, the same goods are passed on to 
  
[T]he economical advantages of commerce are surpassed in impor-
tance by those of its effects which are intellectual and moral.  It is 
hardly possible to overrate the value, in the present low state of hu-
man improvement, of placing human beings in contact with persons 
dissimilar to themselves, and with modes of thought and action 
unlike those with which they are familiar.  
JOHN STUART MILL, PRINCIPLES OF POLITICAL ECONOMY 581 (1909).   
 12. For a plethora of formalistic economic arguments analyzing free trade 
on the international level, see PETER H. LINDERT & CHARLES P. KINDLEBERGER, 
INTERNATIONAL ECONOMICS 17–110 (7th ed. 1982) [hereinafter LINDERT & 
KINDLEBERGER]; THEORY, POLICY, AND DYNAMICS IN INTERNATIONAL TRADE 75–
130 (Wilfred J. Ethier et al. eds., 1993).  But cf. Charles K. Rowley, The Inter-
national Economy In Public Choice Perspective, in THE ELGAR COMPANION TO 
PUBLIC CHOICE 645, 645–46 (2001) [hereinafter Rowley, The International 
Economy].  Rowley notes:   
Issues of international trade commonly are framed in terms of na-
tions and not of individuals….Yet, this use of language, while un-
doubtedly economical, has some problematic features.  In reality, in-
dividuals trade, not nations, a fact of considerable importance for un-
derstanding international economic relations, yet one that is widely 
ignored.  Models that construe trade as between nations and not as 
between individuals stem from notions of economic nationalism that 
characterized the mercantilist era. 
Id. 
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consumers more cheaply than would have been possible before.  
However, domestic producers must accordingly lower the resale 
price of their product to compete with the foreign imports.  Con-
sumers win, but domestic producers in this particular industry 
are, from their own vantage point, worse off than they were be-
fore13 — at least in the short term.14 
B.  The Problem of Interest Groups 
Although the gains from trade in the aggregate far outweigh 
the costs, the benefits are diffuse: an influx of foreign imports in 
a particular industry will afford a potentially broad base of con-
sumers the opportunity to buy the industry’s goods at a rela-
tively cheaper price.  The cost of these imports, by contrast, is 
heavily concentrated: domestic producers may see profit mar-
gins reduced, jobs cut, or their doors closed entirely.  Moreover, 
individuals specialize in production, not consumption.15  Produc-
ers in industries adversely affected by free trade16 will accord-
  
 13. See John O. McGinnis & Mark L. Movsesian, The World Trade Consti-
tution, 114 HARV. L. REV. 511, 522 (2000) (“Workers often cannot change in-
dustries easily because they have nontransferable skills. Owners’ capital, 
moreover, may not be mobile because the owners have invested it in industry-
specific assets.  As a result, workers and owners in industries that lack a com-
parative advantage stand to lose a significant portion of their income.”). 
 14. But cf. id. at 522 (“[F]ree trade may make many of these workers and 
owners better off, as open borders create higher-paying jobs and higher re-
turns to capital.”). 
 15. LINDERT & KINDLEBERGER, supra note 12, at 227.  The authors provide 
the following example to illustrate the importance of production to an individ-
ual over his consumption: 
If an import barrier would raise the price of all automobiles by ten 
percent, an auto worker would know which side of his bread has more 
butter.  The barrier brings a 10 percent markup in the product from 
which he derives all of his earnings.   To be sure, it also means that a 
car would cost him 10 percent more, but the cost of owning a car is 
only, say, 6 percent of his yearly expenses….So the import barrier 
would only raise his cost of living by .10 x .06 = 0.6 percent, while giv-
ing him a share of an auto-industry pie that is 10 percent larger.  For 
an auto consumer not employed in the auto industry, the barrier 
simply means a 0.6 percent loss in real income.   
Id. 
 16. This Article repeatedly discusses the benefits of, and from the perspec-
tive of particular groups, the costs of, “free trade.”  In reality, of course, there 
is no choice between unrestricted free trade and total protectionism; rather, in 
the context of political markets, the choice will invariably concern erecting 
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ingly try to persuade the government to erect protectionist bar-
riers to trade in furtherance of their own self-interest.17  If the 
costs of mobilization are not prohibitive, these domestic produc-
ers will invest the resources necessary to lobby for a tariff that 
will bestow benefits to these groups in excess of the costs neces-
sary to effectively endorse the legislation.18  Put another way: 
interest groups that face organization costs of less than one dol-
lar in order to gain one dollar of benefits from trade regulations 
will be effective demanders of those regulations.19   
By contrast, the individuals that stand to gain from free trade 
in any given industry will find that the costs of mobilization 
often outweigh the benefits of free trade — i.e., the benefits that 
flow from foreign imports.  In other words, the benefits to a par-
ticular individual of a cheaper product will almost certainly be 
outweighed by the costs any one person must incur to fight a 
protectionist measure20 — flying to Washington to meet with a 
  
some protectionist barrier or removing one.  For simplicity’s sake, however, 
when this Article describes how “free trade” might impact a particular indus-
try, and the incentives such an impact generates, it is meant to refer to relax-
ing whatever protectionist measures might already exist in that particular 
industry (or refusing to erect new ones).   
 17. See, e.g., ROBERT Z. LAWRENCE & ROBERT E. LITAN, SAVING FREE TRADE: 
A PRAGMATIC APPROACH 23–24 (1986) (arguing that when faced with competi-
tive threats, interest groups will invariably pressure the legislature to pass 
protectionist measures). 
 18. See Gordon Tullock, The Welfare Costs of Tariffs, Monopolies, and 
Theft, 5 WESTERN ECON. J. 224, 228 (1967) [hereinafter Tullock, The Welfare 
Costs of Tariffs] (“One would anticipate that the domestic producers would 
invest resources in lobbying for the tariff until the marginal return on the last 
dollar so spent was equal to its likely return producing the transfer.”). 
 19. PETER MOSER, THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF THE GATT 19 (1990). Robert 
B. Ekelund, Jr. & Robert D. Tollison, The Interest-Group Theory of Govern-
ment, in THE ELGAR COMPANION TO PUBLIC CHOICE  357 (2001).  
The interest group theory of government seeks to explain governmen-
tal  behavior on the basis of the costs of organizing interest groups in 
order  to seek wealth transfers through the aegis of the state (or, what 
is analytically the same thing, the costs of organizing interest groups 
to resist governmental expropriation of wealth).   
Id. 
 20. See LINDERT & KINDLEBERGER, supra note 12, at 228.  
The costs of getting organized are usually greater for large and dif-
fused groups than for smaller concentrated groups.  As anybody 
knows who has tried to gather support among many people with indi-
vidually small stakes in an issue, there can be acute problems both in 
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Congressman, drumming up support, or even taking the time to 
write a letter of protest, notwithstanding the fact that such 
measures, in isolation, are unlikely to have any effect in the 
first place.21   
  
reaching them and in getting them to commit effort to the common 
cause….By contrast, more concentrated groups find it easier to get 
together and contribute to a common lobbying effort.  Each member, 
being a sizable part of the group’s total membership and resources, 
knows that his participation does indeed make a difference…. 
Id. (emphasis in original) See also McGinnis & Movsesian, supra note 13, at 
523–24.  McGinnis notes: 
As concentrated groups, workers and owners can obtain substantial 
benefits from government action. Consequently, these groups have 
strong incentives to provide campaign contributions and electoral 
support in return for protectionist policies. In contrast, groups that 
benefit from free trade, such as consumers, are diffuse, and their 
gains, though large in the aggregate, tend to be small on an individ-
ual basis. These groups have comparatively few incentives to contrib-
ute time and money to lobby for free trade policies. Moreover, they 
face high agency costs in monitoring legislators to determine whether 
their representatives are yielding to interest groups at the expense of 
society as a whole. 
Id. (citing to MANCUR OLSON, JR., THE LOGIC OF COLLECTIVE ACTION: PUBLIC 
GOODS AND THE THEORY OF GROUPS 145 (1965)).  
 21. A recent example of this principle in action that made national head-
lines is the furor surrounding President Bush’s decision to impose tariffs on 
steel imports.  See James Cox, Bush Slaps Tariffs on Steel Imports, USA 
TODAY, Mar. 6, 2002, at B1.  The picture accompanying the article captures an 
impassioned group of protestors outside the White House in Washington, 
D.C., holding a sign that reads: “You don’t have to blow up a blast furnace to 
destroy a steel mill; illegal foreign imports are doing the job.”  These steel 
workers, as noted above, have a strong incentive to mobilize and invest the 
resources necessary to campaign for protective barriers.   
  To its credit, Cox’s article actually recognizes the direct effect of impos-
ing the tariff in a subheadline: “Consumers will pay more…,” and later identi-
fies the costs of tariff imposition to include, in addition to increased consumer 
prices, lost jobs for manufacturers that purchase steel (who will now find its 
operating costs increased after steel prices rise), political retaliation, and un-
dermining the Bush administration’s “free-trade message.”  Id.  Not surpris-
ingly, however, there were no reports of individual consumers outside the 
White House that day protesting against tariffs.  But see James Cox, Steel 
Tariff Ruling Tests Bush, USA TODAY, Nov. 11, 2003, at A1 (noting that a 
WTO appellate panel “upheld an earlier ruling that Bush violated trade rules 
in March 2002 with three-year tariffs on imported steel”).  See also Paul 
Wiseman & James Cox, Competing Interests Tangle Textile Policy: Bush 
Pledged to Help Pakistan, but U.S. Industry Fought  Plan, USA TODAY, Apr. 2, 
2002, at B1 (noting that President Bush handed Pakistan only one-third of the 
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Accordingly, the potential winners of free trade, who are the 
victims of protectionist policies, nonetheless lack incentive to 
engage in individual lobbying efforts because the costs are pro-
hibitive relative to the diffused costs of a particular protection-
ist measure (or diffused gains from the lack thereof).22  In the 
  
trade concessions Pakistan had requested in the wake of a post-September 
11th economic slump after U.S. textile producers vehemently protested grant-
ing any relief to Pakistani imports).   
  At base, however, the request for “protection” is nothing more or less 
than a request for a transfer of wealth.  Cf. Tullock, supra note 18, at 226 and 
accompanying text (noting that the social costs of tariffs far exceed a mere 
transfer of wealth, and that the costs of tariffs are equivalent to a government 
mandate that an industry run itself inefficiently).  The cries of steel employees 
to erect protectionist tariffs may effectively be translated as: We want an ex-
tremely large group of people to each pay a small amount of money (the in-
crease in the price of goods) to us.  See also ROBERT NOZICK, ANARCHY, STATE 
AND UTOPIA 272 (1974) (“The illegitimate use of a state by economic interests 
for their own ends is based upon a preexisting illegitimate power of the state 
to enrich some persons at the expense of others.”).   
  In fairness, lobbyists and interest groups are not necessarily willful 
“rent seekers.”  See generally Daniel Klein, If Government Is So Villainous, 
How Come Government Officials Don’t Seem Like Villians?, 10 ECON. & PHIL. 
91 (1994) (“In most cases, people do not perceive themselves to be rent seek-
ers….”); Gordon Tullock, Future Directions for Rent-Seeking Research, in THE 
POLITICAL ECONOMY OF RENT-SEEKING 477 (Charles K. Rowley et al. eds., 
1988) (“The student who did not understand the arguments against protective 
tariffs, and who is later hired as a lobbyist by the cotton textile industry, 
probably operates with a good conscience when he retains false economic ar-
guments.”).   
 22. See Robert W. McGee, An Economic Analysis of Protectionism in the 
United States with Implications for International Trade in Europe, 26 GEO. 
WASH. J. INT’L L. & ECON. 539, 541 (1993) [hereinafter McGee, Protectionism 
in the United States].  As Professor McGee notes: 
[S]pecial interests — auto manufacturers, steel companies, the textile 
industry, and others — have much to gain by enlisting the aid of gov-
ernment to protect them from foreign competition.  On the other 
hand, the large majority of the population, comprised of unorganized 
consumers, has little to lose by any particular protectionist legisla-
tion, and may not even know that the measure is costing it money in 
the form of higher prices. 
Id.  McGee proceeds to quote Vilfredo Pareto to succinctly sum up the state of 
affairs: “A protectionist measure provides large benefits to a small number of 
people, and causes a very great number of consumers a slight loss.  This cir-
cumstance makes it easier to put a protectionist measure into practice.”  Id. 
(quoting VILFREDO PARETO, MANUAL OF POLITICAL ECONOMY 379 (Ann S. 
Schwier & Alfred N. Page eds., Ann. S. Schwier trans., Augustus M. Kelley 
Publishers 1971) (1927)). 
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aggregate, however, the social costs of protectionism are enor-
mous. 
While it cannot be denied that a free flow of foreign imports 
may result in a loss of domestic jobs in the particular industry 
in question, and that erecting protectionist barriers therefore 
“saves jobs” to an extent in that industry,23 the net effect of pro-
tectionism may well be to reduce the total number of jobs.24  
  
 23. This threat of competition is, of course, the primary reason why the 
groups that face a competitive threat from free trade would be acting in their 
self-interest to expend resources in an attempt to erect protective barriers.  
See supra Part I.A. 
 24. Empirical data suggests that “[t]he argument that imports cause a 
decline in net employment is not only wrong; it is the exact opposite of the 
truth.”  Dan Griswold, Trade, Jobs, and Manufacturing: Why (Almost All) 
U.S. Workers Should Welcome Imports, TRADE BRIEFING PAPER No. 6, Cato 
Center for Trade Pol’y Stud., Sep. 30, 1999 at 2, available at http://www. 
freetrade.org/pubs/briefs/tbp-006.pdf.  Griswold notes that the statistical cor-
relation between job growth and import volume has been a “strong .89.”  Id. at 
3 (citing to the Economic Report of the President 1999, Bureau of Labor Statis-
tics).  See also ARTHUR T. DENZAU, HOW IMPORT RESTRAINTS REDUCE 
EMPLOYMENT 2 (Center for the Study of Am. Business Pub. No. 80, 1987) (not-
ing that the voluntary restraint agreement placed on steel in 1984 increased 
employment by 16,900 jobs in the steel industry, but destroyed 52,400 jobs in 
industries that use steel); McGinnis & Movsesian, supra note 13, at 525.  
McGinnis notes: 
The trade restrictions secured by protectionist interest groups are 
particularly deleterious to social welfare. It is well established in eco-
nomic theory that the most effective way to increase the income of 
disadvantaged groups is through direct transfer payments. For in-
stance, direct transfer payments are preferable to rent control as a 
method of improving housing for the poor because direct transfers 
lack the substantial deadweight loss that accompanies rent control. 
Instead, it is better to provide the poor with housing vouchers. Simi-
larly, with the wealth generated by free trade, society can provide 
transfers to people with less income, including those for whom trade 
provides no advantage or even a net disadvantage. For example, in-
stead of pressuring the Japanese automobile industry to adopt volun-
tary export restraints in the 1980s, the United States could have paid 
cash compensation to American autoworkers. This strategy would 
have cost far less than the $3 billion that American consumers ulti-
mately spent in higher car prices. 
Id. (citations omitted).  See also Barbara Hagenbaugh, Steel Tariffs Catch 
Some in Middle, USA TODAY, July 24, 2002, at B1 (noting that the imposition 
of tariffs on steel imports has caused many “mom-and-pop” manufacturers, 
who “use steel to make goods that go into everything from cars to ovens to 
batteries,” to worry that they will have to close their doors). 
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Moreover, in any situation where a particular industry is pro-
tected from more efficient competitors25 through government 
legislation, the government may be said to be subsidizing ineffi-
ciency.26  It makes little sense to “force consumers to spend an 
extra $160,000 a year in the form of higher prices to protect a 
job in the auto industry that pays roughly $30,000 or $40,000 a 
year.”27 
  
 25. This point assumes the competition is “more efficient” because the 
same product is offered for lower prices than the domestic competition.  Were 
this not the case, domestic producers would not face a competitive threat. 
 26. See McGee, Protectionism in the United States, supra note 22, at 545.  
Professor McGee also cites to studies illustrating that trade restrictions raise 
the cost of imported goods in the United States by 20% on average, and raise 
the price of comparable, domestically produced goods by 10% to 14%.  Id. at 
553 (citing Alan Murray, A Free-Trade Bastion, U.S. Isn’t Half as Pure as 
Many People Think, WALL ST. J., Nov. 1, 1985, at A1.   McGee continues:  
Trade restrictions on automobiles, clothing, and sugar cost U.S. con-
sumers $14 billion in 1984, which amounted to a 23% income tax sur-
charge for families with incomes under $10,000, but translated into 
only a 3% surcharge for families with incomes over $60,000.  Protec-
tionism in the textile industry alone has been estimated to cost poor 
families almost 9% of their disposable income.  Another study found 
that textile quotas cost the poorest fifth of the U.S. population 3.6% of 
their income, but resulted in a 0.3% increase in income for the top 
fifth.  
Id. (citations omitted).  See also Rowley, The International Economy, supra 
note 12, at 665–66 (noting a study by Hufbauer and Elliot in which the poten-
tial gains to consumers from removing all tariff and quantitative restrictions 
for the year 1990 alone were calculated to be $70 billion).  Cf. Paul Wiseman, 
China’s Low-Cost Labor Lures More Japanese Companies, USA TODAY, Nov. 
21, 2002, at B1 (noting the Japanese fear of cheap Chinese labor, but observ-
ing that now “with gusto, Japanese executives are descending on Chinese 
boomtowns…spending their nights crooning into the karaoke machines of 
local bars and their days scouring the industrial landscape for factories they 
can do business with.”). 
 27. McGee, Protectionism in the United States, supra note 22, at 545.  See 
Rowley, The International Economy, supra note 12, at 645, 668.  Rowley notes: 
It is often argued that trade protection preserves jobs in the United 
States (the so-called ‘Perot effect’).  If so, the cost to consumers of pre-
serving such jobs is extremely high.  In a quarter of the 21 sectors 
scrutinized by Hufbauer and Elliot (1994), the cost per job saved was 
in excess of $500,000 per annum even ignoring rent-seeking 
costs…Thus, consumers expended more than six times the average 
annual compensation of manufacturing workers to preserve jobs 
through import restraints, even ignoring rent-seeking costs.  Once 
rent-seeking costs are accounted for, consumers expended more than 
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A detour through formal economic theory will illustrate this 
point more explicitly.  Figure 128 shows a commodity that can be 
produced domestically at the cost of P1 and imported at P0.  
With a given demand and no tariff, Q0 units will be purchased 
at a price of P0.  If a protectionist tariff is imposed, then Q1 units 
will be purchased at a price of P1.  Consumers will consequently 
be paying a higher price for the commodity then they otherwise 
would in the absence of the protectionist tariff, so the increase 
in price is a transfer of wealth from some members of the com-
munity to others.  The corresponding welfare loss — a transfer 
more than outright loss to the economy — is represented by the 
shaded triangle.   
  
ten times the average wage earned by a worker in such a protected 
job. 
Id. See also James P. Miller, Steel Tariffs Paint Bush into Corner, CHI. TRIB., 
Sep. 19, 2003, at 3–1 (noting that “[e]ver since the tariffs were put into ef-
fect…U.S. makers of everything from barbecue grills to auto parts and bull-
dozers have complained loudly that the tariffs have disrupted steel supplies, 
raised their costs and made it harder than ever to compete with offshore com-
petitors.”). 
  For an argument based entirely on first principles against any such 
redistributive scheme, see NOZICK, supra note 21, at 272 (“The illegitimate use 
of a state by economic interests for their own ends is based upon a preexisting 
illegitimate power of the state to enrich some persons at the expense of oth-
ers.”); Rowley, The International Economy, supra note 12, at 668.  Rowley 
notes: 
Although the large majority of economists view the issue of free trade 
versus protection exclusively in utilitarian terms, the issue should 
also be viewed from a rights-based perspective.  Free trade follows as 
an inevitable implication for any individual who endorses the phi-
losophy of John Locke as it does for any individual who endorses 
Jasay’s principles of first, avoid doing harm and when in doubt, ab-
stain. 
Protection violates the economic freedom of those who wish to engage 
in trade, encroaching as it does upon their property and contract 
rights.  Any government that imposes trade restraints in the absence 
of the unanimous consent of those who are thus coerced commits a 
tort and should be exposed to potential civil suits to compensate those 
who suffer harm. 
Id. (emphasis in original). 
 28. The graph in Figure 1 appeared in Tullock, The Welfare Costs of Tar-
iffs, supra note 18, at 225 fig. 1. 
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There are, however, a number of significant costs ignored by 
this analysis.  The actual effects of the tariff would be much 
more far-reaching.  Because the domestic producers are now 
engaged in producing a commodity that, absent the protection-
ist tariff, could be produced and imported more cheaply, re-
sources are being inefficiently utilized.  As Gordon Tullock has 
pointed out, the situation is therefore indistinguishable from 
any situation in which the government forced a domestic indus-
try to abandon an efficient method of production and adopt an 
inefficient one.29  Thus, the real welfare loss incurred by the tar-
iff would not just be the wealth transfer represented by the 
shaded triangle in Figure 1, but rather the entire area to the 
left of the triangle (bounded vertically on both sides by P1 and 
P0).  In other words, “a tariff shifting production from the pro-
duction of export goods to import-replacement goods where the 
country has a comparative disadvantage is, in fact, a govern-
mental requirement that the goods be obtained in an inefficient 
manner....”30  Accordingly, the cost of a protectionist tariff is the 
shaded triangle “plus the difference between domestic cost of 
  
 29. Tullock, The Welfare Costs of Tariffs, supra note 18, at 226. 
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production and the price at which the goods could be purchased 










Moreover, as discussed above,32 governments do not simply 
impose protectionist tariffs unilaterally.  Domestic producers 
will expend resources to hire interest groups to engage in politi-
cal lobbying, and foreign exports will likely expend resources 
attempting to counteract the effects of domestic special interest 
lobbying.  These expenditures, which may ultimately offset each 
other in part, are pure waste in terms of social wealth.33  They 
are spent, not increasing wealth, but in attempts to transfer or 
resist the transfer of wealth.34  The opportunity costs of failing 
  
 31. Id. 
 32. See supra notes 16–19 and accompanying text.  
 33. See Charles K. Rowley & Robert D. Tollison, Rent-Seeking and Trade 
Protection, in THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF RENT-SEEKING 222 (1988)  [hereinaf-
ter Rowley & Tollison, Rent-Seeking] (“Clearly, societies characterized by 
widespread monopoly and dissipative rent-seeking will, ceteris paribus, be 
significantly less wealthy than those that are not.”). 
 34. See Tullock, The Welfare Costs of Tariffs, supra note 18, at 225; Jona-
than R. Macey, Public and Private Ordering and the Production of Legitimate 
and Illegitimate Legal Rules, 82 CORNELL L. REV. 1123, 1144 (1997) (“Special 
interest legislation is undesireable because economic actors expend vast 
amounts of resources to obtain rent-seeking legislation, to comply with it…, to 
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to invest these same resources elsewhere in the economy (where 
they might actually create wealth) therefore imposes additional 
societal costs.35 
The effects of special-interest lobbying become clearer by ex-
amining the “supply side” of public legislation, i.e., the incentive 
structure of politicians and bureaucrats.  What might be 
deemed the “high school civics”36 conception of the relationship 
between legislators and their constituents is one of agency.  We 
expect that our legislators will act on our behalf, and, in ques-
tions of policy, will consult our interests and behave accord-
ingly.37  But in fact, this model of the legislator-constituent rela-
tionship paints a far rosier picture than reality will bear.   
“Economics treats the individual actor as the fundamental 
unit of analysis,”38 and derives its predictive power based on a 
fundamental conception of human nature.39  In ordinary mar-
kets, the individual actor is  
  
first place.”).  See generally MANCUR OLSON, THE LOGIC OF COLLECTIVE ACTION 
(1965).  
 35. And not least of all, any tariff involves expenditure on administrative 
costs necessary to maintain the tariff — for example, “customs inspec-
tors…who do the actual collection and coast guards who prevent smuggling.”  
Tullock, The Welfare Costs of Tariffs, supra note 18, at 225. 
 36. The “high school civics” label was borrowed from Donald J. Boudreaux, 
Review Essay, Was Your High School Civics Teacher Right After All?, 1 INDEP. 
REV. 111 (1996).  
 37. See Mark L. Movsesian, Are Statutes Really “Legislative Bargains”?  
The Failure of the Contract Analogy in Statutory Interpretation, 76 N.C. L. 
REV. 1145, 1175 (1998).  Nevertheless, the author concedes that the issue of 
whether a legislator should consult the interests of his constituents and be-
have accordingly on issues of policy has been the source of a “longstanding 
debate on the nature of political representation.”  Id. at n.186. 
 38. William F. Shughar II & Laura Razzolini, Introduction: Public choice 
in the millenium, in THE ELGAR COMPANION TO PUBLIC CHOICE  xxii (William F. 
Shughart II & Laura Razzolini eds., 2001) [hereinafter Shughart & Razzolini, 
Introduction]. 
 39. See, e.g., JAMES BUCHANAN & GORDON TULLOCK, THE CALCULUS OF 
CONSENT 18 (1962). The authors stress the focus on the individual actor in 
economic theory by emphasizing that: 
[E]conomic theory does not try to explain all human behavior, even 
all of that which might be called ‘economic’ in some normally accepted 
sense of this term.  At best, the theory explains only one important 
part of human activity in this sphere….No economist, to our knowl-
edge, has ever denied that exchange takes place which is not “eco-
nomic”….The theory requires for its usefulness only the existence of 
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a person who, as a consumer, strives to maximize his own 
sense of well-being, given the constraints imposed by a limited 
budget and the prices of available goods, who, as a worker, 
strives to maximize his income, given his native talents, the 
skills he has acquired, and his tastes for work and leisure, and 
who, as a business owner, strives to maximize his profits, 
given the constraints imposed by technology, by the costs of 
inputs and the tastes and preferences of buyers.  No matter 
what role he plays, however, the individual actor is assumed 
to be guided largely by self-interest.40 
The central tenet of public choice theory41 is the emphasis of 
the methodological individualism of economic analysis (tradi-
tionally reserved for the study of market actors) in the study of 
politics and political actors.42  Once the rational actor model is 
applied to the realm of politics, several insights become imme-
diately obvious.  Public choice rejects the construction of vague, 
ambiguous collective units, such as “society,” the “people,” or 
the “national interest.”43  Actors in the public sector have the 
same self-interested incentives as market actors; the “public 
interest,” however defined, is no longer the guiding light of po-
  
the economic relation to a degree sufficient to make prediction and 
explanation possible. 
Even if the economic forces are not predominant enough in human 
behavior to allow predictions to be made, the formal theory remains 
of some value in explaining one aspect of that behavior and in allow-
ing the theorist to develop hypotheses that may be subjected to con-
ceptual, if not actual, testing.  Reduced to its barest essentials, the 
economic assumption is simply that the representative or the average 
individual, when confronted with real choice in exchange, will choose 
‘more’ rather than less. 
Id. (emphasis in original). 
 40. Shughart & Razzolini, Introduction, supra note 38, at xxii. 
 41. See generally id. 
 42. See Shughart & Razzolini, Introduction, supra note 38, at xxii. 
While for model-building purposes ‘self-interest’ is frequently con-
strued narrowly to mean wealth maximization, the rational actor 
model is in fact much more general.  Economists assume that indi-
viduals pursue the maximization of utility, of which money wealth is 
only one component, thereby allowing for the fact that human action 
is guided by a variety of goals and objectives…. 
Id. 
 43. Id. 
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litical behavior.44  Elected officials will strive for reelection, and 
appointed officials will strive to secure larger agency budgets 
and to advance their careers.45  If a political actor supports legis-
lation at the behest of particular interest groups, he will be re-
warded by these groups with increased campaign contributions 
or promises of large blocs of votes.46  Policy proposals will there-
  
 44. Lest it be said that these tenets of public choice theory paint an unduly 
pessimistic view of human nature (as is asserted in Steven Kelman Public 
Choice and Public Spirit, 87 PUBLIC CHOICE 80, 80–94 (1987)), it should be 
noted that:  
[P]ublic choice no more denies the existence of ‘public spirit’ than 
economics denies the existence of altruism.  Specialists in neither 
field have ever argued that self-interest is the only motivator of hu-
man action.  Rather, the shared assumption of economics and public 
choice is that self-interest is the most important of the many and var-
ied forces that animate the behavior of complex individuals. 
Shughart & Razzolini, Introduction, supra note 38, at xxvi (emphasis in origi-
nal). The basis of this assumption, therefore, is not a cynical view of human 
nature, but the recognition of “repeated empirical testing showing that models 
based on self-interest do a better job of explaining observed behavior than 
models based on alternative behavioral assumptions.” Id. On a similar note, 
commentators have also advanced the following explanation for the utility of 
adopting such as assumption:   
Compared with the more standard works in political science, our 
analysis may seem to involve a “pessimistic” view of human nature.  
For scientific progress, however, it is essential that all conceivable 
assumptions about human behavior be tested.  If our models  provide 
some explanations of real-world events, and we believe that they do, 
our assumptions must have some empirical validity, quiet apart from 
the “attractiveness” of the human characters that inhabit our hypo-
thetical model world. 
BUCHANAN AND TULLOCK, supra note 39, at 266. 
 45. Shughart & Razzolini, Introduction, supra note 38, at xxii; LINDERT & 
KINDLEBERGER, supra note 12, at 226.   Lindert and Kindleberger point out, 
however, that the reelection-maximizing assumption need not imply the cyni-
cal view of politicians  
who will stop at nothing to get reelected and who care only about the 
glory, salary, and power that come with retaining office….The in-
cumbents may in fact be motivated primarily by their own loftier vi-
sion of the national interest and how they would serve it with some 
key steps if reelected. 
Id. 
 46. See McGinnis & Movsesian, supra note 13, at 523 n.59  (“[I]nterest 
groups may exercise great leverage over legislators through campaign contri-
butions or independent political expenditures.” (citing Daniel H. Lowenstein, 
 
File: SpirutMacro2.5.04.doc Created on: 2/5/2004 5:28 PM Last Printed: 4/8/2004 1:39 PM 
2004] RATIONAL IRRATIONALITY 727 
fore be evaluated by the extent to which a politician’s odds of 
reelection (or personal stature) are enhanced or diminished by 
implementing the policy.47   
C.  High School Civics Fails Again: The True  
 Nature of Democracy 
Thus far this Article has shown that trade is as natural to 
humankind as is “song to a songbird,”48 and that free trade al-
lows individuals to reap the benefits of comparative advantage 
and specialization of labor.49  It has also demonstrated, however, 
that while the benefits of free trade are often diffuse, those ad-
versely affected by competition will bear heavily concentrated 
costs.50  Consequently, these groups have a strong incentive to 
lobby for protectionist measures to forestall competition.  Con-
sumers who might otherwise reap the benefits of open barriers, 
by contrast, lack incentive to mobilize in lieu of organization 
costs and will therefore not wield any significant degree of in-
fluence over political markets relative to organized interest 
groups.  Political actors, for their part, will act in accordance 
with their own self-interest by attempting to implement policies 
that benefit interest groups willing to reciprocate with cam-
paign contributions or votes of gratitude at the next election.  
The protectionist legislation that will potentially emerge from 
this process, however, imposes enormous societal costs in the 
aggregate. 
None of the foregoing, however, explains why, if political ac-
tors are truly self-interested, efforts to promote socially harmful 
legislation for the benefit of a privileged few is truly a self-
interested act.  After all, if the majority of voters (consumers) 
  
Political Bribery and the Intermediate Theory of Politics, 32 UCLA L. REV. 
784, 826–28 (1985))).  Cf. Jonathan Weisman, ‘Pork’ Noses Into Non-Profits, 
USA TODAY, Apr. 22, 2002, at A1 (noting a trend in which “members of Con-
gress are establishing their own charities, funding them through the House 
Appropriations Committee and taking pork-barrel politics to a new level”).  
 47. See, e.g., LINDERT & KINDLEBERGER, supra note 12, at 227 (“Any incum-
bent knows that to get reelected he needs to approach each individual issues 
asking, ‘How can I maximize the votes and campaign backing of those people 
for whom this is the issue that is key to their election sentiments?’”). 
 48. See McGinnis, supra note 3 and accompanying text. 
 49. See supra Part I.A. 
 50. See supra Part I.B. 
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will end up paying higher prices for particular products as a 
result of protectionist legislation, then surely they will penalize 
the politicians who supported the legislation by withholding 
their votes in the next election.  This, of course, is one of the 
central virtues of democracy: well-informed voters replace gov-
ernment officials who fail to serve the public interest with offi-
cials who better serve the public interest,51 and therefore “pre-
vent government from being a toady to special-interest 
groups.”52  Much the same way that actors in private markets 
self-interestedly absorb information and act accordingly, voters 
will monitor the politicians they vote into office to ensure that 
these politicians do not support harmful interest-group legisla-
tion.   
This conception of political markets constitutes what might 
be deemed the second tenet of high school civics.53  Much like 
the first tenet, however, it must be condemned as grossly naïve 
and simply not consistent with reality.54  Private-property mar-
kets and political markets are fundamentally distinct in that 
“there is no such thing as a voiceless private-property market 
participant.”55  Every action of a private market participant 
  
 51. For a recent and highly sophisticated exposition of this view, see 
DONALD WITTMAN, THE MYTH OF DEMOCRATIC FAILURE 5 (1995). 
 52. Boudreaux, supra note 36, at 115 (criticizing Wittman). 
 53. The “first tenet” of high school civics was discussed above at supra 
Section I.B (arguing that politicians do not scrutinize laws by the extent to 
which they benefit the public, but rather by the extent to which supporting 
such laws will earn the favor of interest groups who can increase the politi-
cian’s odds of re-election). 
 54. See Rowley & Tollison, Rent-Seeking, supra note 33, at 224.  The au-
thors note: 
[The standard] theory concludes that once governments are informed 
of the clear net benefits of unilateral trade liberalization, they will do 
away with trade protection, compensating losers, if necessary, via a 
non-distortionary tax/subsidy intervention.  Much of the interna-
tional trade literature seems to be dedicated to this process of infor-
mation transmission.  However, governments patently do not respond 
as the pure theory predicts they will.  Public choice explains theoreti-
cally why governments accept generalized wealth destruction by 
maintaining and even extending trade protection policy even in a 
well-informed political market. 
Id. 
 55. See Boudreaux, supra note 36, at 116.  A simple example may be used 
to drive home this distinction: 
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conveys information about the value a participant places on a 
particular product.  In the aggregate, this information combines 
to create the pattern of prices existing at any moment.  More-
over, because every individual who participates in a private 
market will bear the cost of his actions, or reap the benefits 
thereof, private market participants have a strong incentive to 
purchase information and use it to guide their decision-making. 
Political markets, by contrast, possess neither of these char-
acteristics.  Even if voters are well-informed,56 the sheer volume 
of issues on the table during any particular election precludes 
registering approval or disapproval for any individual issue.  As 
Boudreaux puts the point,  
[i]ssues from abortion to school choice to government provision 
of medical services to farm subsidies to child-welfare policies 
to tax rates to…you name it, government has some potential 
say over them.  Literally tens of thousands of issues are at 
stake in every national election (with almost as many issues at 
stake in state elections).  And yet, each voter during each six-
year span has a maximum of nine ballots to cast in four na-
tional elections.  During any six-year period…each voter is al-
lowed to vote twice for a president/vice-president team, four 
times for a U.S. Representative, and a maximum of three 
times for a U.S. senator…[These] are the only windows of op-
portunity for American voters to speak politically on national 
issues.57 
Accordingly, the claim that voters will register disapproval of 
attempts to pass harmful interest-group legislation with their 
votes is naively optimistic.  A voter cognizant of his Congress-
man’s support for various protectionist legislative proposals 
may decide that the politician’s positions on abortion, campaign 
  
Every time we buy or sell something — or refuse to buy or sell some-
thing — we communicate with property owners around the world by 
adding our “voice” to the market.  If you purchase a new Honda Ac-
cord today, you reveal to the market that you value such a car by at 
least the price you pay for it.  If you sell some labor services today, 
you reveal to the world that you will perform such services for a wage 
at or above the amount your employer pays you.   
Id. 
 56. For a discussion of the incentives of voters to acquire and digest politi-
cal information, see infra notes 58–62 and accompanying text. 
 57. See Boudreaux, supra note 36, at 117. 
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finance reform, or the environment take precedence over harm-
ful protectionist legislation.58  Put simply, commercial policy is 
not formed by direct public referenda.59 
Moreover, the second tenet of high school civics posits that 
voters have a rational incentive to acquire and digest political 
information.  This incentive is presumably a corollary of the 
view that voters recognize their duty to operate as a check on 
(costly) self-interested political behavior.  In practice, the exces-
sive level of noise in political elections precludes registering ap-
proval or disapproval of specific attempts to pass harmful inter-
est-group legislation.  What is more, on balance, citizens have a 
strong disincentive to pay the cost of acquiring and digesting 
political information.  Thus, not only are voters precluded in 
practice from checking harmful political behavior because of 
excessive political noise; voters are ill-equipped to identify in-
terest-group legislation in the first place. 
If the average voter watches the evening news or occasionally 
skims a newspaper, she may know if a particular candidate is a 
Democrat or a Republican, and that between two candidates of 
each major political party, one is more likely to be further “to 
the right” than the other.60  This knowledge in itself, however, is 
largely useless.  For voters to deter opportunistic political be-
havior they must be informed of specific proposals or attempts 
to support specific legislation.  In reality, however,  
[h]ow many American voters know that the national govern-
ment subsidizes sugar farmers and peanut farmers?  How 
many Americans understand the consequences of deficit fi-
nancing?  How many can distinguish the government’s budget 
deficit from the so-called trade deficit?  Indeed, how many vot-
  
 58. See Boudreaux, supra note 36, at 118 (further noting that “[i]nterest 
groups can obtain a great deal of pork if such pork is bundled with other gov-
ernment programs and policy issues”). 
 59. See LINDERT & KINDLEBERGER, supra note 12, at 225.  The authors con-
tinue: “Voters are not given the chance to go to the polls and vote for and 
against, say, ‘Proposition P: The import duty on motorcycles shall be raised 
from 5 percent to 10 percent ad valorem: Yes…No.’” Id. at 225–26.  It should 
be noted, however, that private markets — including, e.g., markets for resi-
dential location — face some of the same bundling problems, albeit to a lesser 
extent.  When an individual purchases a home, to take one example, many 
variables are undoubtedly at play: proximity to family, proximity to grocery 
stores, crime rates, local school systems, and so forth. 
 60. See Boudreaux, supra note 36, at 117. 
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ers know most federal regulations can be looked up in the 
Code of Federal Regulations — a document of double-
columned small print that now gobbles up almost twenty feet 
of library shelf space?  I suspect very few.61 
It is highly improbable that the average citizen could possibly 
monitor the number of actions taken by incumbents to act as a 
sufficient check on socially harmful behavior, or comprehend 
the full implications of any proposals championed by other can-
didates, even if he wanted to.  But what is more, not only does 
the average citizen have a strong disincentive to pay the cost of 
acquiring political information because she is unlikely to under-
stand all of it in the first place; the odds of any citizen’s “re-
search” paying off for that person are infinitesimal.  In other 
words, if the odds of a single vote changing the result of an elec-
tion are mathematically zero, and if voting is the one method by 
which citizens register their voice in political markets,62 then a 
strong disincentive to pay the costs of acquiring information 
exists.63  Voters will therefore remain rationally ignorant.  By 
contrast, since private-market actors must bear the full costs —
or reap the full benefits — of their actions, a strong incentive 
exists to acquire information.  Accordingly, the analogy between 
private and political markets simply cannot be maintained.  
The “problem of interest groups” lives. 
  
 61. Boudreaux, supra note 36, at 122. 
 62. My assumption here that the average voter may “express his voice” 
only in elections follows from the previous discussion of the costs of mobiliza-
tion as prohibitive, supra Part I.B.  
 63. These same premises also lead to the conclusion that individual citi-
zens may choose not to vote at all.  See, e.g., U.S. Census Bureau, Current 
Population Survey: Voting and Registration in the Election of November 2000 
(Feb. 2002) (noting that nineteen million registered voters did not cast ballots 
in the 2000 presidential election, and that of the nineteen million non-voters 
20.9% of voters reasoned they were “too busy,” 14.8% refrained from voting 
because of “illness,” and 12.2% were “not interested”), available at http://www. 
census.gov/prod/2002 pubs/pb20-542.pdf.  See GORDON TULLOCK, ON VOTING 
(1998), for more formalistic arguments concerning the nature of voting behav-
ior.   
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II. THE SOLUTION 
A. Leading By Example: The United States Constitution as a 
Model for International Federalism 
In the context of international trade,64 the principal task of 
trade institutions like the WTO should be to “restrain protec-
tionist interest groups and thereby promote both free trade and 
representative democracy.”65  The American political structure, 
through the United States Constitution, offers compelling in-
struction on how institutions can simultaneously promote free 
trade and democratic governance.66 
Much the same way that interest groups lobby for protection-
ist tariffs at the federal level, such groups may attempt to lobby 
for entry barriers at the state level.  Perhaps the most famous 
exposition of the danger of interest groups was set forth by 
James Madison in The Federalist No. 10.67  There, Madison rec-
ognized that individuals and groups would try to use the power 
of government to further their own interests.68  Several institu-
tional mechanisms of the United States Constitution reflect this 
concern.  For example, the large Republic described in The Fed-
  
 64. The foregoing discussions of the nature of interest groups and the fal-
lacy of “high school civics” are not, of course, confined to the context of free 
trade.   
 65. McGinnis & Movsesian, supra note 13, at 536. 
 66. Id. (“The original Constitution established mechanisms that restrict 
protectionist interest groups, and subsequent generations have developed 
further structural limitations.  These constraints have made representative 
democracy more reflective of majority will, improved regulatory efficiency, and 
promoted economic growth through trade.”). 
 67. See The Federalist No. 10, at 45–51 (James Madison) (Clinton Rossiter 
ed., 1961).   
 68. See BUCHANAN AND TULLOCK, supra note 39, at 25 (“[Madison’s] numer-
ous examples of legislation concerning debtor-creditor relations, commercial 
policy, and taxation suggest that perhaps a better understanding of Madison’s 
own conception of democratic process may be achieved by examining carefully 
the implications of the economic approach to human behavior in collective 
choice.”); John O. McGinnis, The Origins of Conservatism, NAT’L REV., Dec. 22, 
1997, at 34 (“…Madison observed that the greatest problem for any political 
structure is how to protect the ‘unequal faculties for acquiring property’ from 
government interference.”).  McGinnis argues that “Madison recognized the 
very inequality that makes this prosperity possible also makes the protection 
of the different abilities to acquire property more difficult because it exacer-
bates the danger that the government will be used as a mechanism for redis-
tribution from one faction to another.”  Id.  
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eralist No. 10 decreased the power of local factions by “pitting 
them against one another in a more extended polity.”69  Gener-
ally, bicameralism and the separation of powers both operate to 
frustrate interest groups by imposing more powerful barriers to 
rent-seeking legislation than simple majoritarian structures.70  
Moreover, the Commerce Clause of the United States Constitu-
tion is employed to strike down state legislation that discrimi-
nates against, or unduly burdens, interstate commerce.71  Thus, 
the creation of an open national market encourages competition 
among the states for the investment of resources. 
The WTO fosters an international trade regime that repli-
cates this brand of federalism.  In the same way that forcing 
state governments to compete for “the capital and skills of a 
national citizenry imposes substantial limits on a state govern-
ment’s ability to expropriate, the emerging free trade regime 
performs the same essential function, tempering the enduring 
and inevitable avarice of the government and its rulers on a 
global scale.”72 
  
 69. McGinnis & Movsesian, supra note 13, at 526–27. 
 70. Id. 
 71. See U.S. CONST. art. 1, § 8, cl. 3 (“The Congress shall have Power…To 
regulate Commerce with foreign Nations, and among the several States, and 
with the Indian Tribes.”).   See Hughes v. Oklahoma, 441 U.S. 322, 336 (1979) 
for the modern commerce clause test.  It should be noted, however, that the 
dormant commerce clause power is merely inferred from the affirmative grant 
of federal power found in the commerce clause itself.  See generally Richard A. 
Posner, The Constitution as an Economic Document, 56 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 4, 
17 (1987) (“A number of provisions of the [U.S.] Constitution seem to have an 
implicit economic logic.  This is perhaps the clearest with respect to the “nega-
tive” or “dormant” commerce clause…”).   
 72. John O. McGinnis, The Symbiosis of Constitutionalism and Technology, 
25 HARV. J.L. &.PUB. POL. 3, 9 (2002).  McGinnis further argues that: 
International federalism is appropriate for our time because indi-
viduals still have the attachments to their nation-states to resist 
regulatory regimes being imposed by world government. Thus, an in-
ternational federalism can plausibly be created because the World 
Trade Organization and other global economic organizations can po-
lice the conditions for regulatory competition among nation-states 
while citizens in those nation-states can be counted on to resist the 
expansion of regulatory power in international institutions. 
Id. at 9–10. 
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B. The World Trade Organization 
With this background in place, this Article now probes the 
WTO’s constitutional structure and illustrates why its internal 
provisions and mechanisms enshrine a regime of international 
federalism that ultimately promotes economic growth within its 
member nations.73 
The WTO was established by the Final Act of the Uruguay 
Round of trade negotiations in 1994,74 and is responsible for 
administering multilateral trade agreements negotiated by its 
members.75  Its principal functions may be described as follows:   
First, the WTO provides a substantive code of conduct directed 
at the reduction of tariffs and other barriers to trade, and the 
elimination of discrimination in international trade relations.  
Second, the WTO provides the institutional framework for the 
administration of the substantive code.  Thus the WTO pro-
vides an integrated structure for the administration of both all 
past trade agreements and the agreements under the Uruguay 
  
 73. It should be noted at the outset that this section offers an account of 
global multilateralism, and the WTO in particular, in necessarily broad 
strokes.  It does not, accordingly, seek to criticize or defend particular treaties 
or the present composition of the WTO.  Rather, this section confines itself to 
illustrating why the nature of an international regime such as the WTO will 
tend to reign in the costs of opportunistic rent-seeking by interest groups.  For 
present purposes, it is sufficient merely to note that politics is a game of com-
promise: invariably, particular WTO provisions that cause more social harm 
than good in the aggregate have hitchhiked along with more economically 
sound provisions.  So long as these questionable provisions remain the excep-
tion, and not the norm, the model illustrated in this section posits that the 
WTO will continue to facilitate economically sound policies more often than 
not. 
 74. “Although the Final Act was signed in April 1994, the WTO did not 
actually come into existence until the following year.”  See McGinnis & 
Movsesian, supra note 13, at 530 n.96 (citing David A. Gantz, A Post-Uruguay 
Round Introduction to International Trade Law in the United States, 12 ARIZ. 
J. INT’L & COMP. L. 1, 7 (1995)). 
 75. The WTO presently has 146 member states.  For a list of the WTO’s 
membership, see World Trade Organization, The Organization: Members and 
Observers, at http://www.wto.org/English/thewto_e/ whatis_e/tif_e/org6_e.htm 
(last visited Nov. 16, 2003).  It was created in part because the legal founda-
tions of the GATT were weak (GATT was, and is, a treaty — i.e., it contained 
no institutional provisions) and in part because two issues on the agenda of 
the Uruguay Round were not covered by GATT: services and intellectual 
property rights.  BERNARD M. HOEKMAN, TRADE LAWS AND INSTITUTIONS 3 
(1995).  
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Round of Trade Negotiations.  Third, the WTO ensures the 
implementation of the substantive code.  It provides a forum 
for dispute settlement in international trade matters, and 
conducts surveillance of national trade policies and practices.  
Fourth, the WTO acts as a medium for the conduct of interna-
tional trade relations amongst member States.  Particularly, it 
is to act as a forum for the negotiation of further trade liber-
alization, and improvement in the international trading sys-
tem.76 
The WTO should therefore be regarded as “both an institution 
embodying a set of rules and principles concerning the use of 
policies that affect trade flows, and as a market in which mem-
bers exchange market access ‘concessions’ and agree on the 
‘rules of the game.’”77  For example, the periodic reductions in 
world tariffs provided for by the WTO have been called its “core 
feature.”78  Even before the inauguration of the WTO, General 
Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (“GATT”) members met ap-
proximately once every ten years in negotiating rounds that 
reduced tariffs on goods on a reciprocal basis.79  These rounds 
produced dramatic reductions in world tariffs.80  The ratio of the 
value of duties collected to the value of imports dropped from 
approximately 37% before the adoption of GATT to less than 5% 
in the early 1990s.81  The inauguration of the WTO continues 
this pattern of reciprocal tariff reductions and expands the 
scope of the system through new agreements pertaining to in-
  
 76. JOHN H. JACKSON, ALAN O. SYKES, & ASIF H. QURESHI, THE WORLD 
TRADE ORGANIZATION: IMPLEMENTING INTERNATIONAL TRADE NORMS 5 (John H. 
Jackson & Alan O. Sykes eds., 1997). Qureshi further notes that “the institu-
tional framework of the WTO can be said to provide a basic, but by no means 
complete, constitutional framework for the international trading system.  The 
system provides for a legislative machinery in the field of international trade, 
for a dispute settlement apparatus, a surveillance mechanism, and an admin-
istrative structure.” Id.  See also Agreement Establishing the Multilateral 
Trade Organization, art. III, Dec. 15, 1993, 33 I.L.M. 13.  
 77. HOEKMAN, supra note 75, at 4. 
 78. McGinnis & Movsesian, supra note 13, at 544. 
 79. Id. 
 80. Id. 
 81. Id.  
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tellectual property, services, health and safety measures, and 
product standards.82 
The theoretical underpinning of this regime of reciprocity is 
as follows.  Governments (i.e., collectives of individual domestic 
political actors) lack incentive to reduce trade barriers unilater-
ally.  Indeed, as discussed,83 politicians will face strong interest 
group pressure to erect new protectionist legislation.  Under a 
multilateral trade agreement that mandates reciprocity, how-
ever, domestic export interests stand to reap benefits that 
largely offset the specific losses incurred by protected indus-
tries.  Removing protectionist barriers in a domestic market will 
result in increased market access abroad.  With foreign markets 
for their goods, these domestic export interests will, under a 
reciprocity regime, naturally exert pressure on political actors 
that will largely counteract the pressure mounted by domestic 
producers to maintain protectionist barriers.84  If reciprocity was 
  
 82. HOEKMAN, supra note 75, at 4; John H. Jackson & Alan O. Sykes, In-
troduction and Overview, in IMPLEMENTING THE URUGUAY ROUND 4 (John H. 
Jackson & Alan O. Sykes eds., 1997). 
 83. Supra Parts I.B – I.C and accompanying text. 
 84. McGinnis & Movsesian, supra note 13, at 545–46 (noting that the 
“WTO system mobilizes the interest groups that stand to win —  workers and 
owners in industries that will prosper because of free trade — to counterbal-
ance the interest groups that stand to lose”).  It should be noted, however, that 
tariff reductions alone cannot ensure a free trade regime.  Id.  As the authors 
powerfully indicate: 
Protectionist groups can frustrate the effect of tariff reductions by 
persuading national governments to impose nontariff barriers.  Even 
if a member complies with GATT-mandated tariff reductions on a 
given product, for example, the member could offset the effect of 
these reductions by imposing quotas on the number of imports al-
lowed into the country.  Therefore, just as the United States Supreme 
Court has developed a doctrine to prevent state nontariff discrimina-
tion against out-of-state imports, the WTO has established a series of 
rules that prevent members from adopting measures that negate the 
value of GATT tariff reductions. 
Id. at 546–47.  The authors continue by noting, for example, that: 
[A]rticle III of GATT prohibits members from imposing special inter-
nal taxes on imports — sales taxes, for example — that exceed taxes 
on “like domestic products.”  Because members might impose dis-
criminatory internal regulations on imports, article III also requires 
members to accord imports “treatment no less favorable than that ac-
corded like products of national origin in respect of all laws, regula-
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not mandated by the multilateral trade agreement, however, 
there would be no guarantee of market access abroad, and do-
mestic export interests would therefore take little interest in 
opposing a protectionist barrier.85 
Accordingly, agreements administered by the WTO create 
pressure for liberalizing access to markets over time in a way 
that is politically more feasible than unilateral action.  Indeed, 
reciprocal liberalization of market access has been a necessary 
(although perhaps not sufficient) condition for the reduction of 
barriers.86  Domestic producers may lose from removing protec-
tionist barriers to imports, but domestic exports win — if recip-
rocity is in effect. 87  But the situation is not a net wash, of 
course, because consumers benefit from free trade.88  The self-
interested politician assumed by public choice theory may be 
moved to act at the behest of powerful interest groups if the 
  
tions and requirements affecting their internal sale,…purchase, 
transportation, distribution or use.”   
Id. at 547 (citing to GATT article III).  See also Rowley, The International 
Economy, supra note 12, at 659.  Rowley notes: 
Tariff protection now plays a diminished role in international mar-
kets, in large part owing to the success of a sequence of multilateral 
tariff-reduction rounds since the end of the Second World War.  In its 
place, protection more frequently takes the form of bilaterally negoti-
ated voluntary export restraints (VERs) negotiated between the gov-
ernments of importing and exporting nations. 
Id. at 660.   
 85. See LINDERT & KINDLEBERGER, supra note 12, at 231–34 (noting that 
when export interests have been organized, policy has tended toward freer 
trade).  The authors quote John Stuart Mill: “A good cause seldom triumphs 
unless someone’s interest is bound up in it.”  Id. 
 86. HOEKMAN, supra note 75, at 4. 
 87. Rowley, The International Economy, supra note 12, at 659.  Rowley 
notes: 
If a free trade agreement (FTA) must liberalize completely trade 
among the partner nations, a particular government might endorse 
an agreement in two types of situations.  The first is the situation in 
which the FTA generates substantial welfare gains for the average 
voter and in which the adversely affected interest groups fail to coor-
dinate their efforts to defeat the accord.  The second is the situation 
in which the agreement creates profit gains for exporters in excess of 
the combined losses imposed on import-competing industries and on 
the average voter. 
Id. 
 88. See supra Part I.A and accompanying text. 
File: SpirutMacro2.5.04.doc Created on:  2/5/2004 5:28 PM Last Printed: 4/8/2004 1:39 PM 
738 BROOK. J. INT’L L. [Vol. 29:2 
stakes are high enough.  However, if countervailing pressures 
offset the interest groups — or if the pressures of one export 
group counteract the forces of an import interest group — then, 
all things being equal, self-interested politicians should look 
with favor upon the consumer benefits of a free trade regime. 
For this analysis to hold, however, the average voter is pre-
sumed to actually prefer free trade — or at worst, that the av-
erage voter remains rationally ignorant.  In fact, however, there 
is reason to believe that the average voter — the individual 
who, as a consumer, will benefit from free trade — is likely to 
outright oppose it.  If this is true, then politicians faced with 
offsetting interest group pressure from import and export in-
dustries may not necessarily advance free trade policies by de-
fault.  Free trade may produce gains in the aggregate, but any 
self-interested politician would obviously take notice if the ma-
jority of his constituency believed that free trade was an evil.  
The following section therefore examines consumer beliefs on 
free trade in more detail, and considers the extent to which the 
WTO may operate to counteract the potentially harmful effects 
of these beliefs, thereby further advancing free trade. 
C. The Missing Link: Rational Irrationality 
It is often said that the proposition that free trade creates 
wealth among nations has been “well established since at least 
the beginning of the nineteenth century.”89  This is undoubtedly 
true — if it is taken to mean “well-established among econo-
mists.”  As far as the general public is concerned, however, 
quite the opposite is true. 
The positive economic beliefs of economists and the public 
appear to be systematically inapposite.90 Professor Bryan 
Caplan has synthesized data from the Survey of Americans and 
Economists on the Economy to directly contrast the views of the 
general public and professional economists.91  The results are 
  
 89. McGinnis & Movsesian, supra note 13, at 521. 
 90. See generally Bryan Caplan, Systematically Biased Beliefs About Eco-
nomics, 112 ECON. J. 479 (2002) (citing data from the Survey of Americans and 
Economists on the Economy 1996) [hereinafter Caplan, Systematically Biased 
Beliefs About Economics].   
 91. Bryan Caplan, Rational Ignorance vs. Rational Irrationality, 54(1) 
KYKLOS 3, 21 (2001); Bryan Caplan, The Logic of Collective Belief, 15 
RATIONALITY AND SOCIETY 218 (2003).  
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startling.  For example, Question 26 of the Survey of Americans 
and Economists on the Economy (1996) (“The Survey”) asked: 
“Which do you think is more responsible for the recent increase 
in gasoline prices: the normal law of supply and demand, or oil 
companies trying to increase profits?”  As Caplan notes, “only 
22% of the general public accepted the supply-and-demand ex-
planation, compared to 85% of economists, while 73% and 8% 
respectively affirmed the second explanation.”92 
The Survey further asked both the general public and its 
group of professional economists a series of questions on “Why 
the Economy Is Not Doing Better Than It Is.”  The results ap-
pear below in Table 1.93 
  
 92. Caplan, The Logic of Collective Belief, supra note 91, at 226.  Cf. JOHN 
MAYNARD KEYNES, THE GENERAL THEORY OF EMPLOYMENT INTEREST AND 
MONEY 383 (1954) (noting that “the ideas of economists and political philoso-
phers…are more powerful than is commonly understood,” and that “the world 
is ruled by little else”). 
 93. This table appeared in Caplan, The Logic of Collective Belief, supra 
note 91, at 227 (citing The Survey, Questions 27 and 29).  Caplan also takes 
up, and adequately treats, the “two main ways one might try to vindicate the 
unbiasedness of non-economists’ economic beliefs.  The first is to maintain 
that the differences reflect economists’ self-serving biases…The second is that 
economics attracts and/or molds individuals with specific ideological and po-
litical views.”  Caplan, Systematically Biased Beliefs About Economics, supra 
note 90, at 434 (citations ommitted).  
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Too Many People are 
on welfare. 70* 22 7 1 
Foreign aid spending 
is too high. 
66* 23 10 1 
There are too many 
immigrants. 
47 32* 19 1 
Companies are send-
ing jobs overseas. 68* 25 6 1 
Business profits are 
too high. 
46 36* 17 1 
Technology is displac-
ing workers. 
46 38* 15 1 
Companies are down-
sizing. 59* 30 9 2 
Economists 







Too many people are 
on welfare. 11 50* 39 0 
Foreign aid spending 
is too high. 
1 13 86* 0 
There are too many 
immigrants. 1 18 80* <.5 
Companies are send-
ing jobs overseas. 6 35 58* <.5 
Business profits are 
too high. 
4 11 85* 1 
Technology is displac-
ing workers. 2 24 74* <.5 
Companies are down-
sizing. 5 38 57* 0 
Source:  Survey of Americans and Economists on the Economy, 
Questions 27 and 29     *=median belief 
 
Caplan proposes a theory of “rational irrationality” to explain 
the systematic divergence of populist beliefs from those of pro-
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fessionally trained economists.94  Put simply, relative prices 
matter.95  People will choose to hold systematically biased be-
liefs based on little or no information with a high level of certi-
tude when the private costs of error are negligible.96  Some be-
liefs, in other words, have practical consequences for the indi-
vidual that holds them.  But others do not.  The rational irra-
tionality model assumes that people have preferences for beliefs 
themselves as well as for outcomes, and that when the private 
costs of error are small enough, people can indulge their pre-
ferred beliefs.97 
For example, if an individual believes that protectionist tar-
iffs produce net gains for the economy, the private costs of error 
are effectively zero.  The odds of this individual’s vote changing 
the outcome of an election are zero, so the odds of his belief ul-
timately “coming back to bite him” are zero.  By contrast, if the 
individual chooses to believe that the automobiles in the street 
he is about to cross are mere apparitions, and that they may 
therefore be disregarded, the costs that this erroneous belief 
may impose on him are enormous.  It should therefore come as 
no surprise that few people are willing to believe that the auto-
mobiles in the street are apparitions, but that many people ap-
parently believe that ghosts haunt houses.  The former imposes 
high private costs of error; the latter does not. Thus, if an indi-
  
 94. See also FRIEDMAN, supra note 10, at 78.  Friedman notes that his fa-
ther-in-law would not consider questioning Friedman’s views on physics, a 
subject in which Friedman holds a Ph.D.  Nevertheless, Friedman’s father-in-
law is quick to disagree with Friedman’s views on economics, despite the fact 
that Friedman has been writing and lecturing on economics for the past 
twenty years, and his father-in-law, as Friedman notes, has never taken an 
economics course in his life.  
 95. Caplan, The Logic of Collective Belief, supra note 91, at 227. 
 96. Id. 
 97. Id. at 227–28.   See also McGinnis & Movsesian, supra note 13, at 524.  
The authors note: 
[P]rotectionist groups enjoy an additional advantage: they can exploit 
nationalist sentiments. These sentiments, which are often deeply 
rooted in a country's tradition and culture, can have a positive impact 
on politics by encouraging the production of public goods. For exam-
ple, they facilitate the common defense and aid in rallying opposition 
to totalitarian oppression, as in Eastern Europe at the end of the 
Cold War. 
Id.  See generally ROBERT H. FRANK, PASSIONS WITHIN REASON x (arguing that 
irrationality may be biologically selected).   
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vidual derives pleasure — consumption value — from the belief 
that particular houses are haunted by ghosts, he may rationally 
adopt this (irrational) belief, because holding the belief pre-
sumably imposes no private costs.  Similarly, in the political 
context, individual voters “can cheaply indulge their systemati-
cally biased beliefs at the ballot box knowing that they are ex-
traordinarily unlikely to alter the outcome.”98 
But the social costs — the costs in the aggregate — of ration-
ally indulging irrational beliefs may be enormous.  Political 
markets represent the paradigmatic example.  Individual voters 
may cheaply indulge their private fantasies without their mar-
ginal vote affecting the election’s outcome, but when all ration-
ally irrational voters do so, the outcome does vary.  Accordingly, 
the voter tendency toward rational irrationality threatens to 
impose significant social costs — more so than those that might 
flow from “mere” rational ignorance alone.  Rationally ignorant 
voters lack incentive to purchase information when the odds of 
their “investment paying off” — i.e., their vote changing the 
outcome of an election — are zero.  But when information is 
provided at no cost, e.g., through the media or political debates, 
the rationally ignorant will at least process it.  Rationally irra-
tional voters, by contrast, already believe they have all the in-
formation they need, and will vote in accordance with their (ir-
rational) beliefs.99  That is, “if voters are rationally ignorant 
about the specifics of trade policy, they can still support general 
procedures to curtail protectionist pressures.  But such proce-
dures would win no favor from voters who affirmatively favor 
protectionism due to their rationally irrational overestimates of 
the social benefits of protectionist policy.”100 
  
 98. Caplan, The Logic of Collective Belief, supra note 91, at 219 (also noting 
that “voter rationality…will normally be an under-produced collective good”) 
(citation ommitted). 
 99. Caplan, Rational Ignorance vs. Rational Irrationality, supra note 91, at 
5. 
 100. Caplan, The Logic of Collective Belief, supra note 91, at 224.  Caplan 
further notes:  
[T]he rationally ignorant at least acknowledge that they have [an in-
formation] problem, so they are open to compensatory political meas-
ures.  Politicians who support such measures win the voters’ favor.  
The rationally irrational, however, deny that they have a problem; 
they don’t want the political system to “help them” overcome their ir-
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Politicians will naturally be sensitive to the belief systems of 
their constituents.  If the majority of voters believe that free 
trade is an evil to be combated, then politicians must take heed, 
and for the very same reasons that politicians are susceptible to 
the influences of interest groups: if reelection and prestige are 
the goals, then politicians must pay attention to the interest 
groups (and class of voters) who make a difference in elec-
tions.101 
Thus, the WTO is revealed to serve an additional, perhaps 
“hidden,” purpose.  It operates as a “scapegoat” for politicians 
attempting to deflect the wrath of constituents angered by free-
trade-oriented policies.  Politicians may simply plead deference 
to the WTO as necessary to achieve other, more worthy (read: 
more popular), societal goals, while at the same time enjoying 
the stream of benefits that flow from increased market access.  
For example, a politician might claim that participation in the 
various multilateral trade agreements administered by the 
WTO is necessary to preserve diplomacy with foreign countries, 
which in turn might be considered essential to the preservation 
of human rights in impoverished countries — a more “noble” 
goal in society’s eyes.102  Whether this is true or not is one thing; 
  
rational biases.  In their eyes, such compensatory political measures 
are useless at best, and insulting at worst.  Politicians who support 
them have little to gain and much to lose. 
Id. at 224. 
 101. If the excessive level of noise in political markets, coupled with rational 
ignorance, precludes voters from checking harmful political behavior, supra 
Section I.C, then concededly, the opposite might hold true as well.  That is, 
even if voters on balance oppose free trade, that factor is merely one of many 
on the table during an election year, and the noise level in political markets 
may therefore check the potential damage caused by this belief.  But the irra-
tional tendencies of voters nevertheless become relevant to the personal calcu-
lus of politicians because ignorance is no longer at issue; by hypothesis, many 
voters go to the booths firmly believing that unencumbered free trade is an 
evil that must be stopped. This tendency therefore threatens to impose 
greater social costs than mere ignorance because voters cannot be persuaded 
to adopt “rational” policies; they will simply believe what they want to believe. 
 102. See John O. McGinnis, World Trade Agreements: Advancing the Inter-
ests of the Poorest of Poor, 34 IND. L. REV. 1361, 1361–62 (2001) (noting that 
free trade is a way to help the world’s poor, and that free trade agreements 
help the expansion of civil rights in developing countries).  McGinnis further 
notes that multilateral trade agreements might actually advance human 
rights more than The Universal Declaration and other human rights conven-
tions, because expanding trade increases the wealth of foreign nations, which 
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what matters from a politician’s perspective is simply whether 
his constituency believes it.103 
In summary, the multilateral treaties administered by the 
WTO — at least to the extent that they call for increased mar-
ket access under a reciprocity regime — mobilize domestic ex-
port interests and counteract the interest group pressure 
mounted by domestic producers who stand to face increased 
competition in the aftermath of increased domestic market ac-
cess.  Politicians in a position to support agreements calling for 
increased market access will then prefer to act in furtherance of 
this goal, because, in the aggregate, free trade will create 
wealth.  These politicians will then naturally take credit for 
increased societal wealth, and will presumably explain these 
benefits by reference to some domestic policy or other imple-
mented by that politician.  But what is more, to appease the 
voter who, while enjoying the benefits of free trade, still con-
demns free-trade policies, politicians may simply plead defer-
ence to a multilateral trade agreement administered by the 
WTO as if adherence to the agreement is some “necessary evil” 
to achieve a greater good, thereby giving political actors the 
best of all political worlds.  Politicians will accordingly reap all 
the benefits of free trade without assuming personal responsi-
bility for its “evils” in the eyes of those constituents who believe 
free trade should be curbed.104  Accordingly, even though the 
  
will result in higher revenue for the local despot.  Offering market access as 
“bait” to improve human rights conditions may therefore be more effective 
than human rights conventions themselves.  Id.  Thus, trade agreements ac-
tually do operate as “means” to the end of human rights and other “greater 
goods.”  Nevertheless, a politician sensitive to the fact that the majority of his 
constituents may actually oppose free trade will have an incentive to bifurcate 
human rights and trade and treat the latter as a “necessary evil.” 
 103. See, e.g., Judy Keen, Cheney Balances Public, Private Diplomacy, USA 
TODAY, Mar. 19, 2002, at A12 (Vice-President Cheney’s aides explaining that 
“political considerations sometimes require leaders to say things publicly that 
contradict what they say in private”).  But cf. Caplan, The Logic of Collective 
Belief, supra note 91, at 234 (noting that politicians who actually share the 
irrational beliefs of their constituents may enjoy a competitive advantage over 
political competitors who do not).   
 104. It is interesting to speculate on how international politics produced the 
WTO in the first place.  As noted above, the immediate impetus for the crea-
tion of the WTO was to correct the failures of GATT.  It may seem strangely 
fortuitous, however, that the world political system would produce an organi-
zation for correcting national (domestic) political failures.  In fact, it is very 
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majority of voters may believe that free trade causes harm, 
playing the WTO as a scapegoat makes support of increased 
market access politically feasible.105   
CONCLUSION 
The average voter may irrationally believe that free trade is 
an evil that should be combated, but, on the theoretical model 
proposed by this Article, the costs these beliefs threaten to im-
pose are reduced by the WTO.  Irrational beliefs that impose no 
private costs may, in general, impose great social costs in the 
aggregate — particularly in the context of political elections, 
where an entire electorate indulging their bliss beliefs may 
eventually bring about socially disastrous policies.  But at least 
insofar as free trade is concerned, if the average voter believes 
that adherence to the WTO is a necessary means to achieving a 
more worthy end, then voters will tolerate the increased market 
access mandated by the WTO’s multilateral treaties, and soci-
ety will continue to enjoy the benefits that flow from free trade. 
  
unlikely that the WTO was created for this reason.  But if it was not created 
for this purpose, then perhaps there is less reason to believe these good (and 
unintended) effects will last. 
 105. It may be questioned whether using the WTO in this manner is not 
without its own set of costs.  For example, perhaps “playing the WTO as a 
scapegoat” further encourages the (possible) natural hypocrisy of political 
actors, or contributes to the accumulation of public disinformation.  It may 
even be said that by playing the scapegoat card, the WTO negotiating process 
may itself become distorted, because without proper negotiating alignments 
internally, parties may not have the best-laid agendas.  These are all points 
worthy of consideration.  Nevertheless, for present purposes, the thesis of this 
Article is simply — and is limited in scope to stating — that rational irration-
ality poses a problem to the proliferation of free trade agendas, but that it 
turns out that the WTO’s status as a potential whipping child has the unin-
tended, and somewhat surprising, consequence of making free trade more 
palatable.   
